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MATURE AGGREGATION AND ANGST: 
REFRAMING COMPLEX LITIGATION BY 
ECHOING FRANCIS MCGOVERN’S 




FIGHTING OVER FISHING 
My introduction to Francis McGovern came in the fall of 1985, when the Yale 
Law School hosted a “National Conference on Litigation Management.”1 There, 
federal district judge Richard Enslen, who sat in the Western District of 
Michigan, talked about his experiences dealing with a volatile lawsuit involving 
fishing rights in the Great Lakes. An 1836 treaty entered into between the United 
States and the Ottawa and Chippewa peoples reserved fishing rights (of some 
kind) to the tribes and was supposed to keep the State of Michigan at bay.2 In the 
1970s, the United States, which was acting in its fiduciary role on behalf of Indian 
tribes, and Michigan disagreed about the respective roles of federal regulation 
and state authority. That dispute resulted in a lawsuit, United States v. Michigan, 
which produced a series of decisions, including recognition of tribal rights.3 
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Baker for her thoughtful suggestions, to the other editors of this volume, to William Rastetter for 
information on the Michigan Fishing litigation, to Adela Lilollari and Urja Mittal for insightful assistance 
in research (current and past), to Bonnie Posick for expert editorial assistance and poignantly, to Francis 
McGovern, from whom I learned a great deal. This essay builds on my discussions of related issues, as 
cited. Like many who write about these issues, I am also episodically a participant in cases, either in a 
role created by a court or as a lawyer for a party. 
 1.  See Symposium, Litigation Management, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 305 (1986). Sponsors included the 
Yale Civil Liability Program chaired by George Priest, an entity called the Center for Public Resources, 
and the ABA Section on Litigation. Id. The Center for Public Resources is not, to my knowledge, 
ongoing; it was an organization whose funders included insurance companies and was guided at the time 
by Judyth Pendell. 
 2.  Treaty of Washington art. 3, March 28, 1836, 7 Stat. 491 (1836). The text stated that the tribes 
retained the fishing grounds in front of such reservations assigned to them. 
 3.  United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (D. Mich. 1979), remanded, 623 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 
1980), modified, 653 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1981). 
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By 1981, the Department of the Interior had let lapse its regulations on fishing 
in the Great Lakes, and conflicts intensified.4 For some tribes, fishing was part of 
their identity and unrestricted access to the Great Lakes was both their legal right 
and essential to their livelihood. Economic concerns also animated non-tribal 
members in Michigan’s commercial fishing industry. For others, fishing was a 
sport about which they were passionate. In 1984, three tribes—the Bay Mills 
Indian Community, the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, and the 
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa-Chippewa Indians—returned to federal court 
to enforce what they understood to be their legally-recognized right to take fish 
in an amount necessary to “maintain reasonable tribal living standards.”5 In 
response, Michigan argued that equitable allocations required considering other 
fishers’ economic needs. Sports fishers argued they had distinct interests, a claim 
that affected Michigan as well in that it garnered revenues and reputational 
benefits from being a destination for tourists. 
Judge Enslen told the group assembled in 1985 in New Haven that he had 
been involved in many cases with challenging and hotly-disputed issues. Yet, 
Judge Enslen said, the fishing rights case was the one in which he feared that 
litigants would resort to violence against each other. Those concerns were 
notable, given that little in Judge Enslen’s background suggested that he could 
be easily daunted. Two decades earlier, in the 1960s, Enslen had gone to 
Mississippi to volunteer in voter registration in the Freedom Summer of 1964. He 
was there when James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Mickey Schwerner were 
murdered.6 Enslen later served in the Peace Corps and headed one of its offices. 
When practicing law, Enslen served as lead counsel for the NAACP in a 1971 
desegregation lawsuit against the Board of Kalamazoo Public Schools.7 After his 
appointment in 1979 by President Jimmy Carter, Enslen presided on several high-
profile cases, including a class action challenging conditions at prisons run by the 
 
 4.  As McGovern explained in discussing the case, the interactions about treaty rights were 
complex. Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 440, 456–57, nn.91–92 (1986) [hereinafter McGovern, Managing Complex Litigation]. 
 5.  Id. at 457. 
 6.  See Richard Enslen Life Story/Obituary, BETZLER LIFE STORY FUNERAL HOMEs, https:// 
betzlerlifestory.com/obituaries/richard-enslen.105829 [https://perma.cc/PJ6J-B9VB]; MICH. DIST. 
JUDGES ASS’N, CELEBRATING FIFTY YEARS 33 (2018), https://courts.michigan.gov/Courts/trialcourts/ 
Documents/mdja_anniversary_booklet_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MYB-WNF6]; Julie Mack, Federal 
Judge Richard Enslen Remembered for Impact on Title IX, Desegregation, and Prison Rights, 
KALAMAZOO GAZETTE (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.mlive.com/news/kalamazoo/2015/02/federal_ 
judge_richard_enslen_r.html [https://perma.cc/HJS6-DNNE]; Freedom Summer Volunteers, DIGIT. 
STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMM. (SNCC) GATEWAY, https://snccdigital.org/freedom-
summer-volunteers/ [https://perma.cc/X6UT-N5RS]; see also Murder in Mississippi, P.B.S., https://www. 
pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/freedomsummer-murder/ [https://perma.cc/95EU-LC4X]. 
 7.  Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Ed., 346 F. Supp. 766 (D. Mich.), aff’d sub nom. Oliver v. Sch. Dist. 
of City of Kalamazoo, 448 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1971); Richard Enslen Life Story/Obituary, supra note 6; 
MICH. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, supra note 6, at 33; Mack, supra note 6. An abbreviated biographical sketch 
may be found at Richard Alan Enslen, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/enslen-richard-
alan [https://perma.cc/S2VX-75LU]. 
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Michigan Department of Corrections.8 Yet, Judge Enslen reported, he was 
worried about the Great Lakes fishing litigation as a source of interpersonal 
violence. 
Enter Francis McGovern, appointed by Judge Enslen as a special master. 
Judge Enslen recounted that, within six months of McGovern’s arrival, a 
settlement had been forged among the three tribes—the Bay Mills Indian 
Community, the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, and the Grand 
Traverse Band of Ottawa-Chippewa Indians; Michigan’s Department of Natural 
Resources; the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; the Michigan United Conservation 
Club; the Grand Traverse Area Sport Fishing Association; the Michigan 
Steelhead and Salmon Fishermen’s Association, and the Michigan Charter Boat 
Association.9 Enslen provided a detailed account of the agreement, which 
included provisions for allotting fish, zones for fishing, and parameters for the 
gear to use for catching whitefish, lake trout, walleye, perch, salmon, and chub. 
Under McGovern’s guidance, that accord was commemorated with a lakeside 
ceremony at which participants passed a peace pipe.10 
More about McGovern’s work in this lawsuit comes from his 1986 article, 
Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation.11 As 
McGovern explained, the law governing the dispute was mushy (my word): the 
concepts of “reasonable living standards,” “subsistence,” “maximizing value,” 
and “equal distribution” were not readily defined.12 Moreover, the parties needed 
to coexist, then and in the future. McGovern also described the intense political 
investment of the parties, and that the tribes and the state saw the implications 
for their sovereignty, autonomy, and identity. Framing the interactions, as 
McGovern recounted, were the tribes’ long experiences of exploitation-through-
negotiation (again, my term) which made them leery of entering into discussions 
with their opponents.13 
McGovern’s “prescription” for resolution was to use the short time-frame 
(four months) before a scheduled trial to develop information and a method (“a 
scorable game”) for each party to assess its own interests and priorities as well as 
to sharpen parties’ focus on negotiating to differentiate concerns so as to 
maximize what was most valued.14 Two innovations can be gleaned from his 
 
 8.  The prison litigation began in 1974, and Judge Enslen’s major decision concluding that prison 
conditions were unconstitutional on a variety of dimensions was Knop v. Johnson, 667 F. Supp. 467, 469 
(D. Mich. 1987), affirmed in part and reversed in part in a consolidated decision by Knop v. Johnson, 977 
F.2d 996 (6th Cir. 1992). 
 9.  Consent Order, United States v. Michigan, No. M26–73 CA (W.D. Mich. Apr. 10, 1985) 
[hereinafter 1985 Michigan Consent Order]; see United States v. Michigan, 12 Indian L. Rep. 3079 
(abridged text) (W.D. Mich. 1985) [hereinafter Bay Mills 1985 Allocation Trial]. 
 10.  The first consent decree ended in 2000. See 1985 Michigan Consent Order, supra note 9, ¶ 53 
 11.  McGovern, Managing Complex Litigation, supra note 4, at 456–68. That symposium resulted in 
a volume of published essays. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986). 
 12.  McGovern, Managing Complex Litigation, supra note 4, at 459. 
 13.  Id. at 460. 
 14.  Id. at 460–63. 
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account: he changed the party configuration by insisting on the inclusion of more 
disputants (potentially expanding the conflict), and he helped steer the group into 
arriving at a settlement that had appeal because it was time-limited. Unlike the 
1836 Treaty, the settlement was initially for fifteen years, with a provision for the 
court’s jurisdiction to continue “thereafter.”15 
McGovern’s methods aimed to delineate the distinctive and the overlapping 
interests of an array of participants. As Judge Enslen detailed in a 1985 opinion, 
the sport fishing groups and others had moved to intervene. After McGovern 
became involved, the court deemed the group “litigating amici.”16 Under that 
umbrella came the Michigan United Conservation Clubs, the Grand Travers 
Area Sport Fishing Association, the Michigan Steelhead and Salmon 
Association, the Michigan Charter Boat Association, and other individual 
licensed commercial fishers,17 all of whom McGovern drew into discussions. 
As to the formal parties, McGovern helped to distinguish the varied views of 
the Bay Mills Indian Community, the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa 
Indians, and the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa-Chippewa Indians, which he 
learned had different relationships to fishing in the Great Lakes. As he put it, one 
tribe sought to preserve its culture; another was focused on the economic benefit; 
and the third, more open to compromise, sought to find accommodations.18 
McGovern also disaggregated “the State of Michigan,” which itself was not 
univocal but included a range of concerns. State officials had to attend to an array 
of interests that included tourism and sports fishing, respect for all of its citizens, 
some of whom were members of Indian tribes and others who were not, and the 
economic needs of its commercial fishing industry. McGovern understood that 
the state leadership was not necessarily cohesive. Therefore, he met separately 
with the Governor, the Attorney General, and the head of the state’s Department 
of Natural Resources.19 The details in his article are vintage McGovern, as he 
enlarged the circle of conflict by welcoming the many people affected (albeit not 
all as full litigating parties with veto power) to be present in some of the 
negotiations. 
McGovern identified what he termed the “five major variables: species of 
fish, quantity of fish, fishing gear, geography, and time.”20 He convinced the 
participants to pool expert data from biologists and to listen to litigants involved 
in fishing conflicts in other states so as to learn about the different methods of 
allocating rights and the various responses of other judges. Demonstrating that 
he was ahead of the curve, McGovern innovated by using computer models to 
 
 15.  1985 Michigan Consent Order, supra note 9, ¶ 53. 
 16.  McGovern, Managing Complex Litigation, supra note 4, at 463 n.108. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 462–63. 
 19.  Id. at 463. 
 20.  Id. at 463. 
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develop game theory-based models of outcomes.21 McGovern thus shaped 
parameters for negotiation and promoted enough of a willingness to compromise 
that an agreement was made, provisional on approval by each party.22 A 
disagreement about the authority of the designated representative of the Bay 
Mills Tribe brought the lawsuit back to Judge Enslen, who held a trial on the Bay 
Mills’ proposed 50-50 allocation and (unsurprisingly) concluded that, instead, the 
negotiated plan was the right result on the merits.23 
By recording the strife that had preceded the settlement, Judge Enslen’s May 
31, 1985 decision documented McGovern’s achievements. After the 1979 district 
court ruling recognizing tribal fishing rights, there had been years of “hard 
feelings, social discord, occasional violence, stipulated court-ordered closures of 
large portions of the three affected Great Lakes, political posturing, protraction 
of the instant litigation, some outward manifestations of racism, and concern 
about the future of Michigan’s greatest resources, her people and her natural 
bounty.”24 In contrast, the settlement set up zones for fishing, allocation rules, a 
series of governing structures (a Joint Enforcement Committee, a Technical 
Fishery Review Committee, an Information and Education Committee, and an 
Executive Council), a mechanism for data collection, and a way to gather funds 
for implementation from both the state and federal governments.25 
What Judge Enslen’s opinion also detailed were the complexities and the 
long-term uncertainties about fishing stock, their habitat, and pollution. Amidst 
those variables and unknowns, the 15-year agreement provided a reasonably 
predictable management plan that avoided “racehorse fishing” —getting as much 
as possible to meet a fixed allotment—and helped to make sustainable the 
resource, at least for a time.26 Zooming out to think about the result in terms of 
contemporary debates about the remedial powers of the federal courts, the 
fishing agreement is one of many examples of results not readily boxed in the 
legal categories of law and equity. Even as the relief sounded in equity and fishing 
allocations were not directly monetized, streams of income were centrally 
affected. 
In short, McGovern helped to bring about an outcome because he changed 
the stakes through excavating the lines of conflict, configuring the disputed 
issues, adding participants, pressing the parties to distinguish their own interests 
and decide on priorities, and altering the longevity of the deal. Instead of seeking 
what today is often called “global peace,” McGovern aimed for a consent decree 
 
 21.  Id. at 462. More recent examples of innovative use of technology come from Elizabeth J. 
Cabreser and Samuel Issacharoff, The Participatory Class Action, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846 (2017). 
 22.  McGovern, Managing Complex Litigation, supra note 4, at 464–65. 
 23.  Id. at 465–66; see also Bay Mills 1985 Allocation Trial, supra note 9. 
 24.  Bay Mills 1985 Allocation Trial, supra note 9. 
 25.  1985 Michigan Consent Order, supra note 9, ¶¶ 31–44. 
 26.  Bay Mills 1985 Allocation Trial, supra note 9, at 3082–87. 
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that was renewable but initially limited to fifteen years.27 By making a multi-party 
case more multi-party and by asking participants not to bind themselves and their 
successors to a world they could not foresee, McGovern found enough common 
ground that the parties agreed to learn how they could manage under a 
settlement that could sunset within two decades. (My account is not rosy-eyed; as 
discussed below, conflicts emerged within that time and, thereafter, a revised 
agreement, with many modifications and an appendix of 28 pages of graphics, 
was put into place until 2020 and then extended for some months thereafter.28) 
A few years after the Michigan fishing litigation settlement, McGovern wrote 
an article that he entitled Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation.29 That 1989 
analysis coined the phrase “mature tort” to capture McGovern’s argument that 
aggregation ought only to occur after many individual cases had been filed and 
litigated. McGovern worried that if “too early”—a metric much debated 
thereafter—aggregation could abort the unearthing of information requisite to a 
fair outcome and an understanding of the legal issues raised. As the title of this 
essay reflects, I have applied his term to him. Early on, McGovern was the 
“mature” person who focused on how to generate remedies that would be 
workable, even if not enduring forever. He aimed to help disputants in the here 
and now. 
II 
TEMPORIZING IN A VARIEGATED AND VULNERABLE LITIGATION 
LANDSCAPE 
Thirty years after McGovern’s analysis about the mature mass tort, 
aggregation itself has gained a maturity that merits reconsidering its forms and 
practices. Above, I revisited some of the lessons from McGovern’s work in the 
1980s. I did so both as a tribute to him and to learn more from what he did when, 
in the fishing litigation, he reconfigured the party structure and moved the 
disputants—and the court—away from a quest for global peace. 
Here, I build on the fishing conflict and McGovern’s other work to bring to 
the fore examples of coordination that alter the composition of disputants, 
including by crossing the formal jurisdictional boundaries with this federation. I 
do so to provide more reasons why aspiring for a “partial peace”—as McGovern 
 
 27.  1985 Michigan Consent Order, supra note 9, ¶¶ 53–55; Fishing Rights Update Due Today, 
INDIANZ (July 5, 2000), https://www.indianz.com/News/show.asp?ID=law/752000-1 [https://perma.cc/ 
M7FH-B7SK]. 
 28.  See Consent Decree, United States v. Michigan, No. 2:73-CV-000260 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 2000), 
ECF No. 1458, Page ID 3216; Fishing Rights Update Due Today, supra note 27; Jim Malewitz, All Eyes 
on Grand Traverse Bay as Deadline Looms for Tribal Fishing Decree, BRIDGE MICH. (Aug. 22, 2019), 
https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-environment-watch/all-eyes-grand-traverse-bay-deadline-looms-tri 
bal-fishing-decree [https://perma.cc/BMJ3-RPZC]. The consent decree entered on August 8, 2000 was to 
expire on August 8, 2020. However, because of ongoing negotiations and Covid-19, the Honorable Paul 
L. Maloney extended the consent decree to December 31, 2020 and then to June 30, 2021. See Order 
Extending the Expiration of the 2000 Great Lakes Fishing Decree, United States v. Michigan, No. 2:73-
CV-000260 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 8, 2020), ECF No. 1903. 
 29.  Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659 (1989). 
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taught the parties to do in Michigan—is preferable to thinking that one is 
wrapping a problem up for good. What is needed, whether the remedies sought 
are equitable, legal, or an amalgam thereof, are more ceremonies of celebration 
marking that lawyers and judges have helped people immediately and 
acknowledging that the results are partial, with the potential for related conflicts 
to emerge or continue. As I argue below, aggregate resolutions can, in various 
situations, be temporizing in that a delineated resolution can provide a time-
frame in which (one hopes) disputants can learn to accommodate, live within its 
parameters as information develops and stakes can change, and if needed, revisit 
aspects of the agreement thereafter. 
To recognize that these resolutions are temporizing, aggregate settlements 
need to articulate ongoing roles for courts, lawyers, and affiliated actors during 
the post-settlement life of complex lawsuits. Even as such a process entails time 
and resources, it can be generative for the parties as they work out whatever 
interactions remain in the wake of their dispute. Moreover, building out this third 
phase is generative for courts and the body politic. When judges shoulder the 
obligations of overseeing the implementation of remedies and engage on the 
record with the disputants, third parties have opportunities to understand what 
has transpired and to see the normative utility and procedural integrity entailed 
in trying to make material the outcomes of judicially-sanctioned resolutions. 
Before sketching a few facets of how to do so, I need to outline how litigation 
has changed in the decades since the 1980s. In addition to knowing a lot more 
about how aggregate litigation functions, we also know that the work of the 
federal courts has shifted. The animating assumptions that brought a group to 
New Haven in 1985 to talk about “litigation management” were that litigation 
was booming, that the federal courts had too many cases, that more were coming 
down the pike, and that changes were needed to handle that volume. Indeed, that 
conference was funded in part by entities often associated with, or named as, 
defendants. The problems from the vantage point of some speakers were the 
overuse of courts and the need to curb their authority. For McGovern, litigation 
had to be managed to help craft solutions; for others, management was aimed at 
shifting away from adjudication and, in some instances, limiting opportunities to 
file claims. 
Since then, the political and legal efforts to circumscribe the use of courts 
have succeeded in reshaping the federal courts’ docket. Even before the Trump 
Administration had its impact on the federal bench, the number of federal filings 
had flattened.30 The trend has continued. By 2020—and holding aside the more 
than 200,000 cases wrapped into a new, massive multidistrict litigation (MDL) 
involving allegedly faulty earplugs for members of the armed services—filings fell 
by about ten percent.31 Moreover, the Court has imposed barriers to access 
 
 30.  Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial: Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto 
Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1900 (2017). 
 31.  In 2020, 470,581 civil cases were filed, of which 202,814 were part of in re 3M Combat Arms 
Earplug Product Liability Litigation, MDL No. 2885 (N.D. Fla). See JOHN G. ROBERTS, SUP. CT. OF THE 
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through narrow constructions of standing.32 The assault on class actions is well 
underway.33 Caps on damages have been put in place in many states. The 
Supreme Court has cut off the use of implied statutory causes of action, and two 
members of the Court have argued to end constitutional implied causes of 
action.34 In addition, millions of consumers and employees had been closed out 
of courts and left to proceed, if at all, single-file into closed arbitrations run by 
providers selected by the entities whose actions they contest.35 The economics of 
litigation pose yet other barriers, as during these decades, the fees charged by 
some lawyers, the costs of retaining experts, and the assessments imposed by 
courts have all increased. 
Reflecting these reconfigurations, many of the litigants who do enter the 
federal courts have limited resources. One window comes from tracking filings 
by people who are self-represented. Of some 260,000 civil cases filed annually, 
about twenty-five percent are brought by people without lawyers, and more than 
 
U.S., 2020 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5 (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.sup 
remecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2020year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LS5-99HC] (“New filings 
in district courts were nominally greater, but excluding filings connected to a single multidistrict litigation, 
they were also lower than the prior year.”); see also id. at 6 (“Civil case filings in the U.S. district courts 
increased 58 percent, from 297,877 to 470,581, mostly attributable to an earplug products liability 
multidistrict litigation (MDL) centralized in the Northern District of Florida, which consolidated 202,814 
filings. Excluding that MDL, civil cases filings fell ten percent.”). 
 32.  See Thole v U.S. Bank N.A., 140 S. Ct. 1615, 1619 (2020). An exception—whose implications 
are not clear—is the 2021 decision of Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792 (2021). 
 33.  See e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Action and the Counterrevolution Against 
Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2017). As I write, the Court is considering yet further 
cutbacks, as it agreed to hear Ramirez v. TransUnion, LLC, a consumer class action that had alleged that 
TransUnion, a credit reporting agency, violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by failing to have 
“reasonable procedures” to ensure accurate information on consumers and of failing to provide adequate 
information to consumers. See Ramirez v. TransUnion LLC, 951 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted 
in part sub nom. TransUnion, LLC v. Ramirez, No. 20-297, 2020 WL 7366280 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2020) (mem). 
The claim entailed incorrectly placed “terrorist alerts” on the front page of the consumers’ credit reports 
that identified individuals whose names matched “specially designated nationals,” potentially engaged in 
illegal behavior. Id. at 1016–17. TransUnion had relied on a “name-only matching protocol,” which the 
jury concluded did not meet the statutory requirements. Id. at 1019. The jury awarded $60 million in 
statutory and punitive damages. Id. at 1017. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, over a dissent concerned that 
the trial had proceeded without sufficient evidence of the range of people who had been wrongly labeled 
by the “name-only” matching system. See id. 
As framed by the defendant company, the question to be addressed is “Whether Article III or Rule 
23 permits a damages class action where the vast majority of the class suffered no actual injury, let alone 
an injury anything like what the class representative suffered.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4–5, 
TransUnion, LLC, No. 20-297.The goal of the petitioners appears to be to return to the ruling in Spokeo, 
Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), which did not rule out standing for the plaintiff; that decision has 
become vulnerable in light of the change in the Court’s membership. Of course, at issue is not only how 
to define “injury” but also the authority of Congress to create remedies and the role played by class 
actions in making lawyers available by representing aggregates. 
 34.  Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Gorsuch, J). 
 35.  Judith Resnik, Stephanie Garlock & Annie J. Wang, Collective Preclusion and Inaccessible 
Arbitration: Data, Non-disclosure, and Public Knowledge, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 611 (2020); see 
also Judith Resnik, A2J/A2K: Access to Justice, Access to Knowledge, and Economic Inequalities in Open 
Courts and Arbitrations, 96 N.C. L. REV. 605 (2018); Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the 
Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015). 
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half the cases before the federal appellate courts are brought by self-represented 
parties.36 In contrast, between thirty and forty percent of pending civil cases are 
part of multidistrict litigation,37 a kind of lawsuit tracked by the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts (AO). Some MDLs include class actions, about which 
we have more limited data, as the AO does not routinely gather information on 
the number of class actions filed. The bipolar distribution—many lawyerless-
litigants and the volume in MDLs—makes plain the centrality of aggregation and 
federal judges’ dependency on it. As Ben Kaplan—central to revising the federal 
class action rule in 1966—explained, aggregate litigation is a key mechanism for 
subsidizing litigants who would otherwise have no effective way to come to 
court.38 
Below, I pull a few examples from the 1980s and 1990s of innovations—often 
involving McGovern. Yet, I am keenly aware that in 2021, the question is whether 
opportunities to use large-scale litigation to enable remedies for a variety of 
individuals will exist. My excavation of these past efforts and my commentary on 
the need to reframe practices and expectations in aggregate cases is based on the 
hopes for a future in which such configurations are welcomed, even as today, a 










 36.  See Judicial Business, tbl. B-19, U.S. Courts of Appeals—Pro Se Cases Filed, By Source—in the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Court’s Judicial Reports (1996-2019), U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts. 
gov/report-names/judicial-business?tn=B-19&pt=All&t=All&m%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%5D=&y% 
5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D= [https://perma.cc/RHP7-QA8R]; Judicial Business, tbl. C-13, U.S. District 
Courts—Civil Pro Se and Non-Pro Se Filings, by District—in the Administrative Office of the U.S. Court’s 
Judicial Reports (2004-2019), U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/report-names/judicial-business?tn=B-
19&pt=All&t=All&m%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%5D=&y%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D= [https://per 
ma.cc/JP3V-HFZZ]. I provide more discussion of changes in the federal courts’ docket in my article 
Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage”: Federal and State Courts in Our Federal System, 91 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1831, 1913–14 (2016). 
 37.  See Lynn A. Baker & Stephen J. Herman, Layers of Lawyers: Parsing the Complexities of 
Claimant Representation in Mass Tort MDLs, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 469, 470–71 (2020). Depending 
on who is counting, the numbers are variously reported and ranged from about 30 to 50 percent in 2019. 
Id. at 470 n.1. As of 2020, and including in re 3M Combat Arms Earplug Liability Litigation, about sixty 
percent of the federal docket was in an MDL. That data was reported by the Chief Justice in his end of 
2020 report. See ROBERTS, supra note 31. 
 38.  Benjamin Kaplan, A Preparatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969); see also 
Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 5 ; Charles 
Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 
744–49 (1997). 
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III 
JURISDICTIONAL REDUNDANCY, COMPLEX COORDINATION, DE-
ESSENTIALIZING STATE, TRIBAL, AND FEDERAL INTERESTS, AND PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
As I have sketched in other essays,39 the jurisdictional redundancy within the 
United States’ form of federalism is a resource that interacts with McGovern’s 
insights about the need to welcome diverse participants and to try to lower the 
stakes through narrowing the time horizon of remedies. Large-scale litigation 
often spills across the formal borders of states, Indian tribes, and the federal 
system.  Hence, today’s aggregates could seek to use extant networks that are 
border-crossing and that reflect cross-border-connections. For a period of time 
in the 1980s and 1990s, judges in state and federal courts aimed (often guided by 
Francis McGovern) to coordinate their work on parallel mass tort actions. For 
example, a consortium of state court judges called themselves the Mass Tort 
Litigating Committee (MTLC).40 An explanation comes from the Honorable 
Helen E. Freedman of New York State’s Supreme (trial-level) Court, describing 
what she termed Coordination of Litigation Within New York and Between 
Federal and State Courts.41 She credited Francis McGovern for finding a way to 
sustain that effort: 
After six prior applications had been rejected to coordinate the asbestos litigation for 
cases filed in federal courts, a number of state judges, correctly anticipating that most 
new asbestos cases would then be brought in state courts, established a state Mass Tort 
Litigation Committee (MTLC) under the aegis of the Conference of Chief Justices to 
discuss techniques for managing asbestos cases. Using the good offices of Professor 
Francis E. McGovern, MTLC obtained funding that would last for about five years from 
the State Justice Institute. The National Center for State Courts administered the State 
Justice Institute grant and handled logistical arrangements enabling the judges to meet 
with each other periodically in different cities. Although it was originally an asbestos 
litigation committee, the Committee’s functions expanded to include other mass torts.42 
While not often invoked in the law review literature, another inter-
jurisdictional initiative was the drafting of The Manual for Cooperation Between 
State and Federal Courts, sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center, the National 
Center for State Courts, and the State Justice Institute. The monograph set out 
 
 39.  See Judith Resnik, Partial “Global Peace”: Federalism and the Long Tail of Remedies in Opioid 
Litigation, 70 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2021); Judith Resnik, Reorienting the Process Due: Using 
Jurisdiction to Forge Post-Settlement Relationships Among Litigants, Courts, and the Public in Class and 
Other Aggregate Litigation, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1017 (2017) [hereinafter Resnik, Reorienting the Process 
Due]. Recognizing the importance of scaling back expectations is not to ignore the complexity of doing 
so when both money and equitable relief are sought. See Lynn A. Baker, Mass Torts and the Pursuit of 
Ethical Finality, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1943 (2017). 
 40.  See Francis E. McGovern, Rethinking Cooperation Among Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1851, 1863–64 (1997); see also Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Cooperative Strategy for 
Federal and State Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1867, 1879, 1894 (2000). 
 41.  Helen E. Freedman & Joseph J. Maltese, Inter-state Coordination, in ROBERT L. HAIG, 
COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS § 18:25 (5th ed. 2020). 
 42.  Id. 
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methods of coordination that the authors thought was the way of the future.43 
They explained that, as “these parallel efforts have been increasingly formalized 
in the respective judicial systems, state and federal courts are now advancing to 
the next logical stage of state–federal coordination of multijurisdictional 
litigation: the development of formal intersystem coordination.”44 But rather 
than moving in that direction, litigation’s opponents have succeeded in damping 
down filings in state and federal courts. For example, Congress enacted the 
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002, which authorizes defendants in 
large-scale state torts to remove cases to the federal courts; proponents of that 
legislation assumed that federal judges would be less hospitable to class actions 
than many state court judges.45 
 During the past decades when entry to courts was more viable than it 
appears to be now, some federal and state judges worked directly together and, 
at times, sat together in the same courtroom, albeit legally in two different 
jurisdictions. Illustrative is the Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litigation, in which 
the Honorable Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York and Justice 
Helen Freedman in New York State’s Supreme Court issued a 1990 co-authored 
opinion with two captions—one for each of their jurisdictions; their ruling was 
docketed independently in both.46 In another case, two judges sat together to 
work on a settlement stemming from the collapse of a hotel skywalk in 
Connecticut; Judge Zampano of the U.S. District Court for Connecticut and 
Judge Frank Meadow of Connecticut’s Superior Court helped lawyers to shape 
an agreement embracing cases in state and federal court.47 
 
 43.  JAMES G. APPLE, PAULA L. HANNAFORD & G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, FED. JUD. CTR., 
MANUAL FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 31 (1997). As they explained: 
The Mass Tort Litigation Committee (MTLC), a standing subcommittee of the Conference of 
Chief Justices, serves as the state counterpart to the federal JPML. Although it lacks the 
authority to command state courts to engage in coordinated pretrial activities, the MTLC 
accomplishes some of the same tasks as the JPML by facilitating voluntary cooperation among 
state courts. In addition to active involvement in ongoing cases (e.g., coordinating discovery and 
trial schedules), the MTLC acts as a communication and information network, developing 
performance standards and standardized procedures for managing complex litigation. It also 
advises state and federal organizations—e.g., the U.S. Congress and the Conference of Chief 
Justices—about the jurisdictional issues implicated by complex litigation. 
Id. 
 44.  Id.; see also NAT’L JUD. COLLEGE, RESOURCE GUIDE FOR MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION 
(2010); NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., FED. JUD. CTR., COORDINATING MULTIJURISDICTION 
LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2013) [hereinafter COORDINATING MULTIJURISDICTION 
LITIGATION]. 
 45.  Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002, 28 U.S.C § 1369. 
 46.  See In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 123 B.R. 7 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y 1990). For discussion, see 
William W. Schwarzer, Nancy E. Weiss & Alan Hirsch, Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordination of 
Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689, 1705 (1992); Asbestos Litigation Crisis in 
Federal and State Courts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. and Judicial Admin. of H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 53–54 (1992) (statement of Helen Freedman, J., N.Y. App. Div.). 
 47.  Sam Howe Verhovek, Pact Reached in Collapse of Building, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 1988), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/16/nyregion/pact-reached-in-collapse-of-building.html [https://perma.cc/9U 
ET-39F7]. 
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Another example of border-connections comes from the Honorable Sam 
Pointer, who was the judge for In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products 
Liability Litigation.48 Sitting in the federal court in Alabama, Judge Pointer 
interacted on a regular basis with more than two dozen state court judges. They 
held a joint Daubert hearing as well as regular conferences.49 Judge Pointer also 
pioneered efforts to impose control over the MDL attorneys; he required 
contributions to what was termed the “common benefit fund” to fund joint 
discovery and to support the structure for proceeding on behalf of the group in 
the MDL.50 
All of the initiatives—like the Michigan fishing settlement’s governance 
structures—take money. France McGovern was able to secure government 
resources for MTLC. Yet federal funds for such efforts are sparse. In 2020, the 
State Justice Institute’s budget of $6.6 million was far from adequate for the 
needs.51 While state courts deal with more than ninety percent of the country’s 
litigation, Congress has provided much more funding for administrative and 
educational support for the federal court system. In 2020, the budget for the AO 
was $94.3 million, and Congress provided an additional $30.4 million for the 
Federal Judicial Center. Absent significant new allocations from Congress for 
state court initiatives or success by the National Center for State Courts in 
attracting grants for such work, contemporary efforts at coordination across 
borders will likely be based in the federal courts.52 
The idea of more joint judicial work comes from people at the trial level who 
see litigants’ needs for responsiveness in courts. But such coordination is complex 
and raises serious legal questions that merit more than this brief essay can sketch. 
Judges talking with each other about parallel cases may well need rules, including 
that parties have access to information exchanged outside their presence among 
the judges. Further, issues of hierarchy lurk, as a federal court can have 
disproportionate informal authority over cases that are not “in” its jurisdiction. 
Thus, I flag only some of the many logistical, legal, economic, and political 
hurdles. These problems need to be addressed in an era of mature aggregation, 
just as we should explore more of federalism’s options and think about how 
 
 48.  MDL No. 926 (N.D. Ala.). 
 49.  In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1463 (N.D. Ala. 1995); 
COORDINATING MULTIJURISDICTION LITIGATION, supra note 44, at 10, for a discussion of joint Daubert 
hearings in federal and state court; APPLE, HANNAFORD & MUNSTERMAN supra note 43, at 128 for a 
sample comprehensive case-management order for consolidated cases. 
 50.  Notice No. 27, Notice of Rights under Breast Implant Litigation, In re Silicone Gel Breast 
Implants, 887 F. Supp. 1463. 
 51.  Budget data for 2020 comes from CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45702, OVERVIEW OF FY2020 
APPROPRIATIONS FOR COMMERCE, JUSTICE, SCIENCE AND RELATED AGENCIES (CJS) 16 (2020), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45702.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PCV-ZL5G]. Budget data for 2019 comes from 
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45237, OVERVIEW OF FY2019 APPROPRIATIONS FOR COMMERCE, JUSTICE, 
SCIENCE AND RELATED AGENCIES (CJS) 17 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45237.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/U5Q5-7QUW]. 
 52.  CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45964, JUDICIARY APPROPRIATIONS, FY2020 11 (2020), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45965.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q35-NJK8]. 
13_RESNIK (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2021 4:12 PM 
No. 2 2021] MATURE AGGREGATION AND ANGST 243 
federal MDLs, bankruptcy, and litigation in state courts (in and outside of state 
MDLs) can intersect productively so that judges and lawyers, including state 
attorneys general, can collaborate.53 
The Great Lakes fishing litigation underscores another facet of federalism, 
which is the need to probe the constructs of “state” and “Indian tribe” to identify 
distinct interests within each. McGovern learned that neither the tribes nor 
Michigan had singular concerns, nor were they fixed. Preferences are not 
exogenous nor static, but formed through multifaceted exchanges.54 Moreover, 
to conceptualize states, cities, Indian tribes, and other subunits as discrete actors 
is to miss that many of their activities are embedded in and related to translocal 
and transnational social movements and organizations. 
The Michigan fishing litigation involved that state, three Indian tribes, the 
federal government, and several private parties. Another example of a 
configuration crossing sovereign lines comes from the problems of acid rain 
affecting the Great Lakes, subunits of the United States and of Canada; 
coordination among those entities illustrates that acid rain, pollution, and wildlife 
do not stop at jurisdictional borders.55 Moreover, dozens of cross-border, 
translocal organizations play roles in shaping national and local agendas. I have 
already mentioned the National Center for State Courts, a private entity 
supporting the work of state judiciaries. Parallels include the U.S. Conference of 
Mayors, the National League of Cities, the National Association of Attorneys 
General, and many more. These translocal organizations of governmental actors 
(TOGAs is my shorthand) gain power because their members hold particular 
public positions.56 I have elsewhere detailed the roles played by TOGAs as norm 
entrepreneurs and information distributors.57 Looking to enlist TOGAs to 
contribute to aggregations would be one way to help bring a range of concerns to 
bear on problems that span the country. 
Reconfiguring expectations about resolutions is the other lesson to emphasize 
here, again drawing on McGovern’s work on the fishing conflicts in Michigan. He 
focused on achieving a fifteen-year agreement rather than trying to gain assent 
to an agreement governing a longer period. Doing so was plainly pragmatic, as 
the parties may well have refused to commit to more. A time frame was (and can 
 
 53.  See Zachary D. Clopton & D. Theodore Rave, Opioid Cases and State MDLS, Clifford 
Symposium DePaul (forthcoming 2021); see also Zachary D. Clopton & D. Theodore Rave, MDL in the 
States, 115 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021); D. Theodore Rave & Zachary D. Clopton, Texas MDL, 
24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 367 (2020). Exploration of judicial innovation in MDL can be found in Abbe 
Gluck and Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, MDL Revolution, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2021). 
 54.  See Judith Resnik, Accommodations, Discounts, and Displacement: The Variability of Rights as 
a Norm of Federalism(s), 17 JUS POLITICUM 209 (2017). 
 55.  Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972, Can.-U.S., Apr. 15, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 301; Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, Can.-U.S., Nov. 22, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 1383. 
 56.  I discuss these organizations and their agendas in Judith Resnik, Joshua Civin & Joseph Frueh, 
Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of 
Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709 (2008). 
 57.  Id. 
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often be) useful because it built in a way to respond to changing needs. And 
indeed, even within those fifteen years, conflicts emerged. 
About half way into the fifteen-year term, Michigan returned to court and 
argued that the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians had 
breached their obligation not to use gill nets; the tribes countered that the state 
had breached its obligation to provide alternatives.58 Judge Enslen agreed in part 
with both sides; he ordered an end to gill net fishing and that the state help 
develop an alternative.59 According to one account, four years thereafter, no 
viable alternative had come into being.60 The discord was one of several, 
including conflicts over salmon fishing rights.61 Nonetheless, and in part through 
what had been put into place in 1985, the parties entered into another agreement 
in 2000 that had a twenty-year time span. (As of this writing, the court had 
authorized more time for negotiations.62) 
The Great Lakes fishing accord (and its discord) underscored that shaping 
workable agreements is hard and that quests for global and even partial peace 
may miss both immediate needs and the difficulties of foreseeing shifts in those 
needs. One way to respond is to rethink the federal procedural rules governing 
aggregation. As I argued in an essay commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of 
the 1966 Rule 23 class action, the contours of Rule 23 should be reconsidered. 
The 1960s drafters could not know what we, who have worked in their wake, have 
come to understand. The Rule’s template of a two-step process—certify and 
settle—misses that large-scale litigation (whether via class actions, multi-district 
litigation, or other modes of aggregation) often entails three steps, with a third 
phase after whatever resolutions are forged.63 Even as the Great Lakes fishing 
litigation built in reconsideration, issues arose along the way. That case is but one 
example of many instances in which facets of an agreement are revisited after a 
settlement is entered. 
When drafting Rule 23 in the 1960s, rule makers assumed a unity of interest 
within a plaintiff class. Worried about the legitimacy of representative actions, 
the drafters took solace in their confidence that judges could identify a group in 
 
 58.  Order No. M 26-73, United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich., Oct. 19, 1992), 
discussed in Karen Ferguson, Indian Fishing Rights: Aftermath of the Fox Decision and the Year 2000, 23 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 97, 134–35 (1998). 
 59.  Order No. M 26-73, supra note 58; see also William Rastetter, The Grand Traverse Band of 
Ottawa and Chippewa Indians Our Opinion, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD EAGLE, Sept. 28 1997 at E11 
(quoting the court’s 1990 transcript ruling). On October 19, 1992 and June 26, 1992, the Court prohibited 
gill net fishing. The June 26, 1992 ruling also ordered that the Grand Traverse Band, in lieu of gill net 
fishing, shall “participate with the State of Michigan in a project to determine the feasibility of small-boat 
impoundment fishing.” Order, United States v. Michigan, No. 2:73-cv-00026-PLM (W.D. Mich. Jun 26, 
1992), ECF No. 1092; see also Order, United States v. Michigan, No. 2:73-cv-00026-PLM (W.D. Michigan, 
Oct. 19, 1992), ECF No. 1109. A series of reports (from the years 1992, 1993, and 1995) detailed these 
experiments. 
 60.  Ferguson, supra note 58, at 136–37. 
 61.  Id. at 137–42. 
 62.  Details of the conflicts after the settlement in the mid-1980s and of the renegotiation underway, 
as of this writing, are in note 28, supra. 
 63.  Resnik, Reorienting the Process Due, supra note 39, at 1018. 
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which a “homogeneity of interests” existed.64 Their examples included customers 
overcharged by a utility and children in segregated schools. Assuming the ability 
of federal courts to perceive when interests were sufficiently aligned to permit 
group-based litigation, the drafters outlined how judges ought to assess requests 
for certification at the outset and then again when a case ended, so as to reaffirm 
the propriety of class treatment. 
That two-step process recognized in part that the interests of groups dealt 
with in the aggregate were not necessarily fixed over the lifespan of a litigation 
and that lawyers for the class needed oversight. The 1966 Rule 23 therefore 
required judges to interrogate the homogeneity of interests at the time of 
certification and then to return to that question at settlement. Amendments in 
2003 expanded the role of courts at certification and at settlement by charging 
judges with appointing counsel for the class, by outlining rules for the award of 
attorneys’ fees, and by enlarging the possibilities for interlocutory appeals.65 
Amendments in 2018 again wrote more detail into the contours of oversight at 
settlement.66 Yet thereafter, Rule 23 (originally in 1966 and in subsequent 
amendments) falls silent; it puts no obligations on judges—or lawyers—to 
continue working to oversee the remedies provided through settlements, to deal 
with disputes that may arise, or to require public accountings for what 
transpires.67 
Given that litigants and that courts depend on aggregation, revisions of Rule 
23 are needed to reconfigure the expectations of courts and parties about what 
“resolution” means. A few judges have exercised authority that ought to be 
spelled out in rules—that jurisdiction must continue to ensure remedial efficacy 
and to take into account the possibility of some forms of reconsideration.68 Doing 
so is not exotic, but a part of the federal common and statutory law of preclusion 
in a variety of areas. Indeed, the potential to revisit outcomes of class action 
litigation was in discussion in the 1960s, when the drafters of Rule 23 debated 
 
 64.  CONG. INFO. SERVS., MODIFICATIONS OF THE PROVISIONS FOR CLASS ACTIONS, APPENDED 
TO TENTATIVE PROPOSAL TO MODIFY PROVISIONS GOVERNING CLASS ACTIONS, RULE 23, at EE-11 
n.5 (1962). This preliminary memorandum was referenced in a related memo, “Class Actions—Some 
Further Thoughts,” which has a handwritten note “August 1962,” at its top; the Further Thoughts memo 
noted that the Modifications memo had been provided in advance of the May 28-29, 1962 meeting of the 
Advisory Committee of Civil Rules, drafting Rule 23. See Class Actions—Some Further Thoughts 1 
(Aug. 1962), from the papers of Professor Kaplan archived in the Historical and Special Collections of 
the Harvard Law Library, at Box 75, folder 5 in the Benjamin Kaplan Papers, 1939–2010, at the Historical 
and Special Collections of the Harvard Law Library. 
 65.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g), 23(h), 23(f), reprinted in 215 F.R.D. 158 (2003). 
 66.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), as amended in 2018 to provide a list of factors to consider for 
evaluating settlements and including “the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to 
the class, including the method of processing class-member claims.” 
 67.  Some districts do make reference to these issues in their local rules. See, e.g., Procedural 
Guidance for Class Action Settlements, U.S. DIST. CT. N. DIST. OF CAL. (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.ca 
nd.uscourts.gov/forms/procedural-guidance-for-class-action-settlements/ [https://perma.cc/4X2A-YS5J]. 
 68.  Putting these provisions into rules is especially important in light of a prevailing narrow 
interpretation of the equitable authority of judges under the rules. See, e.g., United States v. Carlisle, 517 
U.S. 416 (1996); see also In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 976 F.3d 664 (6th Cir. 2020). 
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whether their rule should require or suggest that potential class members receive 
notice. The drafters puzzled about whether a class action rule could bind one side 
but not the other. Focused on misbehavior by defendants such as utility 
companies, the drafters considered whether only a defendant in a class action 
would be precluded from subsequently contesting the first ruling, while plaintiff 
class members might not be barred from bringing claims again.69 
Currently, several kinds of cases leave open the possibility for change. 
Decisions on child custody and on support routinely provide for reconsideration 
as children age and if family circumstances alter. On the criminal side, the writ of 
habeas corpus recognizes the potential (rare under current doctrine and statutes) 
that judges need to revisit convictions and sentences. Civil rights injunctions are 
another example, as the U.S. Supreme Court has crafted a distinctive approach 
licensing modification of some kinds of injunctions in light of events subsequent 
to their entry.70 In the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Congress built in 
obligations to end or reconsider resolutions in lawsuits involving unconstitutional 
prison conditions.71 The long litigation related to the harms of Agent Orange 
provides another illustration, albeit one in which efforts to alter the agreement 
were rebuffed despite the emergence of new information about the harms of that 
poison.72 These examples reflect that the common law doctrine of preclusion has 
been and can be tempered in light of the needs of litigants in context-specific 
settings to enable judges to return to decisions or settlements.73 
Large-scale litigation has a long tail. We have learned from more than six 
decades of complex litigation like the Michigan fishing dispute and in a range of 
other aggregate proceedings that the conflicts among the parties and within 
classes or subgroups do not always stop when a settlement is achieved. 
Resolutions reflect that reality, as decisions and agreements often build in special 
masters and compliance monitors; in cases involving economic relief, a parallel 
set of auxiliary personnel oversee implementation. Disagreement about terms 
often arise, and plaintiffs and defendants may return to court to seek 
enforcement. Thus, for those focused on civil rights and prisoner class actions, 
this third phase of litigation, complete with public scrutiny of the decisions made, 
is familiar. Yet the incentives to return to court in cases resulting in large 
 
 69.  I provide more analysis of that discussion in Judith Resnik, “Vital State” Interests, “Vital” State 
Interests: From Representative Actions for Fair Labor Standards to Pooled Trusts, Class Actions, and 
MDLs in the Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1790–96 (2017). 
 70.  See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992); Horne v. Flores, 577 U.S. 433 
(2009). 
 71.  Prison Litigation Reform Act § 801, 42 U.S.C § 1997e (2012). 
 72.  See Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 510 U.S. 1140 (1994); Hartman v. Diamond 
Shamrock Chemicals Co., 510 U.S. 1140 (1994); see also In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 
F.2d 1425, 1430 (2d Cir. 1993); Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co., 781 F. Supp. 902, 912–14 (D.N.Y. 1991). 
 73.  Preclusion also requires specific inquiries into what was and what was not litigated. See Lucky 
Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., 140 S. Ct. 1589 (2020) 
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monetary settlements are different. Defendants seeking economic closure have 
few incentives to raise questions about the distribution of remedies.74 
Nonetheless, some mass tort or economic injury cases have included ongoing 
remedies with post-settlement oversight in place. For a period of time, heart valve 
product defect lawsuits included medical monitoring remedies.75 The Agent 
Orange settlement provided for social services for veterans.76 More recently, 
Judge Vince Chhabria, sitting in the Northern District of California, has in a few 
cases structured an ongoing relationship of the litigants to the court. In a class 
action settlement brought by people working with Lyft and seeking monetary 
relief, Judge Chhabria conditioned his approval on a series of post-settlement 
accountings.77 In one such order, plaintiffs’ counsel was instructed to provide the 
judge with a “notice of completion of duties,” to be filed after the final 
distribution of payments, and to include the total amount distributed, the number 
of class members to whom payments were sent, the amounts paid, the checks 
cashed, and discussion of the issues that had arisen.78 In another, dealing with a 
class of potentially more than three million people, challenging the charges 
imposed for some fifteen years by Wells Fargo, Judge Chhabria issued what was 
styled an “order granting final approval, service awards, and attorneys’ fees” 
approving the establishment of a $142 million fund.79 That order directed that, 
“[w]ithout affecting the finality of this Judgment, the Court reserves jurisdiction 
over the Class Representatives, the Settlement Class, and Defendants as to all 
matters concerning the administration, consummation, and enforcement of the 
Settlement Agreement.”80 Yet another example comes from pending litigation 
about the methodology used by CIGNA, found to have harmed employee 
pension plans, in its reformation of those plans; the plaintiff-class has called for a 
post-judgment accounting and court oversight.81 
 
 74.  For a discussion of defendants’ absence, see Lynn A. Baker, Mass Tort Remedies and the Puzzle 
of the Disappearing Defendant, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (2020). 
 75.  See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability for Medical Monitoring and the Problem of Limits, 
88 VA. L. REV. 1975 (2002); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone 
Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. 
REV. 815 (2002). 
 76.  In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 851 (D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d sub nom. In 
re Agent Orange Prod Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 77.  See Order Requiring Notice of Completion of Duties, Cotter v. Lyft, 176 F.Supp.3d 930 (N.D. 
Cal. April 6, 2018). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Jabbari v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 15-CV-02159-VC, 2018 WL 11024841 (N.D. Cal. 2018); 
Revised Order Document 271 Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Approving Service 
Awards, and Awarding Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses at 15, Jabbari, No. 15-CV-02159-VC (N.D. Cal. 
June 14, 2018). 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  See Order Denying 591 Motion for Accounting, Amara v. CIGNA Corp, No. 3:01-cv-02361 (D. 
Conn. Aug. 6, 2020), Doc. No. 606; Order Denying 607 Motion for Clarification, Amara, No. 3:01-cv-
02361 (D. Conn. Sep. 10, 2020), Doc. No. 609; Brief and Special Appendix of Plaintiffs-Appellants in No. 
20-3219, Amara v. Cigna Corp., No. 20-3219 (2d. Cir. Feb. 4, 2021). 
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In short, this third phase exists in some cases, and it needs to be 
institutionalized and regularized through rules that organize roles for the parties, 
the lawyers, and the judges. To sustain lawyers’ involvement during this third 
phase entails shaping new incentives; to do so, judges are needed to oversee what 
Sam Issacharoff has called the “equitable administration of justice.”82 For 
example, in some aggregations, a leadership team (the Plaintiff Steering 
Committee or other such appellations for these ad hoc law firms) is one part of a 
larger configuration, including individually-retained plaintiffs’ attorneys filing 
the cases initially (IRPAs, as Denny Curtis, Deborah Hensler, and I once called 
them).83 When IRPAs are involved and if individualized work is needed,84 
structured fee awards could link payments to IRPAs for client-centered work 
during this third phase when lawyers need to help clients receive relief within a 
settlement structure.85 As I also noted, evidence of defendants’ involvement in 
implementation in such cases is scarce. Indeed, defense lawyers often become 
invisible post-settlement. Yet implementation ought not be solely the province 
of plaintiffs’ lawyers. Courts can fashion obligations for defendants to cooperate 
and, when possible, lower transaction costs of remedies. Approval of agreements 
could require joint work and post-settlement accountings from all lawyers of their 
efforts to implement remedies. 
IV 
GENERATING ONGOING RELATIONSHIPS AMONG LITIGANTS AND COURTS: A 
HOMAGE TO FRANCIS MCGOVERN 
Return then to fishing in the Great Lakes, the 1980s and the decades 
thereafter. The 1985 Michigan consent agreement had a series of implementation 
provisions, and the 2000 successor agreement had yet more. With all the 
committees and structures, the parties nonetheless returned frequently to court. 
Rather than bemoan those interactions, they ought to be appreciated as 
exemplary of complex remedies for hard problems. Once an agreement has been 
reached, the parties and the courts should expect that implementation would 
generate new information and with it, that more disagreement can emerge. And, 
 
 82.  Samuel Issacharoff, Rule 23 and the Triumph of Experience, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., No. 
2, 2021, at 161, 182. 
 83.  Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate: 
Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 300 (1996); see, e.g., In re Nineteen 
Appeals Arising Out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 982 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1992); In 
re Thirteen Appeals Arising Out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 56 F.3d 295, 300 (1st 
Cir. 1995). 
 84.  See Order Denying Non-Class Counsel’s Motions for Attorneys’ Fees, In re Volkswagen “Clean 
Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2672 CRB (JSC), 2017 WL 1474312, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2017). Judge Charles Breyer denied “244 motions for attorneys’ fees and costs filed 
by attorneys who did not serve as Class Counsel . . . [b]ecause Volkswagen did not agree to pay these 
fees and costs as part of the Settlement, and because Non-Class Counsel have not offered evidence that 
their services benefited the class, as opposed to their individual clients.” Id. Such lawyers could, of course, 
recoup fees from individual clients with whom they had retainers. Id. 
 85.  See Baker and Herman, supra note 37. 
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whether discord emerges or not, and whatever forms remedies take, court 
oversight is needed to ensure distributional fairness and to facilitate public access 
to the processes and outcomes of these large-scale cases. 
Francis McGovern wisely helped to shape a fifteen-year aspirational 
agreement that, even within that time, proved fraught with discord. What he 
brought into being was a partial peace that created a path to ongoing negotiations 
and less violent interactions among the various parties. His goals ought to be our 
goals: to ease the tensions and to find ways to respond to harms through legal 
structures that put people into ongoing relationships in which they work together. 
The many lawsuits that generate ongoing relationships among disputants under 
the umbrella of consent decrees with a range of remedies are marks of Francis 
McGovern’s contributions. 
 
